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A Functional Approach to the Applicability of
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act
to Agency Statements of Policy
A large gap often exists between a federal administrative
agency's understanding of its law and policy and the understanding
of outsiders.' Two of the principal means available to agencies for
structuring their discretionary power through policy making,2 and
thereby closing this gap, are the issuance of policy statements and
rules.3 A general policy statement is usually less structured than a
rule and may reflect the agency's belief that its policy is not yet ripe
enough to be formalized in a rule. 4 Since general statements of
agency policy can be issued in any form5 and may not come to the
attention of affected private parties,' the need exists for a mecha-
nism by which policy statements with more definite standards can
be developed and publicized. Such a mechanism is available to
agencies in the form of administrative rulemaking7 under the notice-
and-comment procedures of section 553 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA),8 which were largely designed to facilitate the
I See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 102 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE]; Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which Should
it Be? 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 658, 662 (1957).
2 Policymaking is a staple of federal agency administration which serves to establish both
the short- and long-term goals of administrative discretionary power. See generally
H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER DEFINITION OF
STANDARDS (1962) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLY].
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 55.
Id. at 102; FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at 146.
The great variety in form which agency policy statements may take is discussed in
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 102; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01,
at 289-90 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS TREATISE]; Davis, An Approach to Legal Control
of the Police, 52 TEXAS L. REv. 703, 706 (1974).
6 A shortcoming of administrators generally is their failure to articulate and publicize
such policy determinations as are made. See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 109-10.
7 See DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 54-56.
8 § 553. Rule making
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that there is involved-
(1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public prop-
erty, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or other
wise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include-
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development of agency policy.9
Under section 553 of the APA, policy statements which fall
within the definition of "rule" provided in section 55110 must con-
form to the notice-and-comment requirements of informal rulemak-
ing.11 Section 553(b)(A) of the APA, however, specifically exempts
"general statements of policy" from the notice-and-comment proce-
dure." Because of the great variety in policy statements, the catego-
ries of exempt and nonexempt statements of agency policy are not
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceed-
ings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and
a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public
procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public inter-
est.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After considera-
tion of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted
a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556
and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less
than 30 days before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a
restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published
with the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issu-
ance, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
See, e.g., ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 14-15 (1941) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]; U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14-15
(1947) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL]; Gellhorn, Public Participation
in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 369 (1972), reprinted in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 376, 386 (1970-72);
Verkuil, Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185, 189-90 (1974). See also WBEN,
Inc. v. United States, 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968); American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
' 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
n 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970).
12 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (A) (1970). Interpretative rules and rules relating to agency organiza-
tion, procedure, and practice are also exempted by this provision. In addition, statements
exempted under this section are exempted from the opportunity to comment requirement
imposed by subsection (c). See S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946) [hereinafter
cited as S. Doc. No. 248].
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clearcut. Instead, policy statements lie on a continuum extending
from those which are obviously rules to those which are not. 3 This
comment focuses on distinguishing between policy statements to
which section 553 requirements apply and those which are exempt.
1 4
The comment proposes an analytic framework which is based
on the intended functions of section 553 as expressed by Con-
gress-the protection of private interests 5 and informed policy mak-
ing by administrative agencies." Since, as will be seen below, the
definitions of "rule" and "general statements of policy" rarely indi-
cate clearly whether notice-and-comment procedures are required,,7
there is a large area in the middle of the continuum where the
11 Three examples serve to illustrate the variation in types of policy statements and the
difficulty in determining whether a given policy statement is a rule. A policy statement which
has been held to be a rule subject to the procedural requirements of section 553 was issued
by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency to the Regional Directors of the Agency
in 1973. The policy established standards for the use of X-ray equipment in airline baggage
inspection and in so doing by implication authorized the use of such X-ray devices by airlines.
See Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974), discussed in text at note 78 infra.
On the other hand, in 1961 the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Agency
released a statement of policy to the press which announced the future goal of consolidating
reasonably adjacent airports to stem the deterioration in the quality of air service to various
areas of the country; this policy was held to be exempt under the "general statements of
policy" exemption to section 553. See Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962),
discussed in text at note 96 infra. Finally, somewhere on the continuum between these two
policy statements is the "Statement of Policy" issued by the Federal Power Commission in
1973 setting forth the Commission's policy that the national interest would best be served by
assigning natural gas curtailment priorities on the basis of "end use" rather than on the
basis of prior contractual commitments. The statement further established that the Com-
mission intended to follow this priority schedule unless a particular pipeline company, sub-
ject to curtailment, could demonstrate the "extraordinary" circumstance that a different
curtailment plan would be more in the public interest. This policy statement was held to be
exempt from section 553 requirements in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1974). For criticism and discussion of this case, see text and notes at notes 88-91 infra.
"1 The analysis presented here is appropriate for use by administrative agencies in deter-
mining when to conform to section 553 requirements and by the courts when presented with
the question of the validity of a policy pronouncement when section 553 procedures have not
been followed.
This comment does not deal with the situation in which an agency refuses to confine its
discretionary power through policy making or fails to communicate in any way its position
on a policy matter. With respect to this problem, see FRIENDLY, supra note 2, at viii & 145;
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 56-57.
,' See text and notes at notes 49-51 infra.
, See text and notes at notes 52-54 infra.
, The Second Circuit has recently recognized that the issue of whether a "general state-
ment of policy" is to be considered a rule "is enshrouded in considerable smog." Noel v.
Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975). In addition, Professor Davis has noted that
"under any view an attempt to distinguish a rule from an announcement of policy which is
not a rule seems likely to yield a fuzzy product. . . ." DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5.01,
at 290. Although the area is one in which clear-cut demarcations are not possible, this fact
does not lessen the need for analysis of the issue. Administrators and courts must face the
decision as to the applicability of section 553 to policy statements on a regular basis.
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applicability of section 553 should be determined largely by the
extent to which notice-and-comment would serve the protection and
informed policy-making functions. Analysis of this issue, however,
must also take into account the competing values and considera-
tions which underlie the exemptions to section 553 procedures.
Since Congress has not provided a framework for the implementa-
tion of its multi-faceted intent, this comment attempts to systema-
tize the congressional concerns and provide an analytic framework
that is sensitive to the competing values articulated by the national
legislature.
This comment proposes a three-stage analysis in order to imple-
ment a functional approach to the applicability of section 553 proce-
dures to agency policy statements. The first step is to determine
whether the protection function alone requires use of section 553
procedures. Private interests can be affected by agency policy in one
of three settings: (1) when the agency policy pronouncement pro-
duces a substantial impact on affected parties and is binding in that
affected parties have no opportunity to challenge the policy before
its application to them; (2) when the impact is less than substantial
but the policy is binding nonetheless; and (3) when the impact is
substantial but the policy is only possibly binding.'8 In the first
permutation alone, section 553 procedures are required by current
judicial standards;' 9 only here does the protection function by itself
compel informal rulemaking. In the second and third permutations
the need for protecting affected parties is somewhat less and does
not provide independent justification for requiring section 553 pro-
cedures. In these situations, the analysis proceeds to the second
stage. The informed policy making function is the key variable at
this point; if section 553 procedures will provide useful information
not otherwise available to the agency, the policy statement should
be considered a rule.
The third stage in the analysis involves the situation in which
the protection and informed policy-making functions can be only
Is Section 553 procedures should not be required where the protection function would not
be served. The requirements of this section were not intended to be used where the only
function to be served is information gathering by the administrative agency. S. Doc. No. 248,
supra note 12, at 20. Thus, although the protection function alone can serve as the justifica-
tion for requiring section 553 procedures, the informed policy-making function cannot. This
is not an unreasonable position since it could be argued that any agency action would benefit
from some additional information on a given issue. This comment is concerned with establish-
ing an analytical framework which provides a technique whereby the interplay of the two
functions can be applied to agency policy statements in a manner consistent with congres-
sional intent on the matter.
1, See text and notes at notes 69-79 infra.
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insubstantially served by the use of section 553 procedures. In this
situation, concerns regarding efficiency and the possibility of driv-
ing agency policy making "underground""0 become operative. When
these concerns prove to be substantial, rulemaking should not be
required.
I. THE DEFINITIONAL APPROACH
A. The Administrative Procedure Act
The structure of the APA requires agencies, affected parties,
and the courts to distinguish between policy statements which are
rules and general statements of policy which are not.2' Section 551
(4) of the APA defines the term "rule" for purposes of the section
553 notice-and-comment procedures as "the whole or part of any
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future
effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy
or to describe the organization, procedure, or practice requirements
of any agency .... "22 This definition of "rule" explicitly includes
policy statements while section 553(b)(A) specifically exempts
"general statements of policy" from the requirements of rulemak-
ing.23 The Act does not, however, contain guidelines for determining
which policy statements are exempt from rulemaking requirements
or attempt to reconcile the conflicting references to agency policy
statements made in the Act.24
21 The phrase "driving policy making underground" refers to the possibility that admin-
istrators will, to avoid section 553 procedures, conceal their policies. See Statement of Profes-
sor Kenneth C. Davis cited in Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation
in the Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy under the A.P.A.,
23 AD. L. Rav. 101, 113 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bonfield Ad. L. Article].
2, A judicial finding that an agency should have complied with section 553 procedures
invalidates the rules in question. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969);
United States v. Finley Coal Co., 493 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974);
Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972); City of New York v. Diamond,
379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
- 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1970).
1 The difficulty in distinguishing between various kinds of policy statements is aug-
mented by the variety of terms used in different sections of the APA. Section 552 (the
Freedom of Information Act) requires publication in the Federal Register of "substantive
rules of general applicability . . . and statements of general policy or interpretations of
general applicability. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1970). On the other hand, section 552
also provides that "[e]ach agency. . . shall make available for public inspection and copy-
ing. . . those statements of policy and interpretations. . . adopted by the agency and...
not published in the Federal Register." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1970).
When a statement of policy or an interpretation adopted by an agency has not been
published in the Federal Register, it is presumably because the policy was not one of general
applicability. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and
[43:430
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B. Nonstatutory Sources of Definition
1. "General Statements of Policy. "The first attempt to define
"general statements of policy" was made in the Attorney General's
Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, which described
them as "statements issued by an agency to advise the public pro-
spectively of the manner in which the agency proposed to exercise
discretionary power. '2 5 This definition emphasizes that such state-
ments are future-oriented and do not establish firm and mandatory
regulations; they inform the public what the agericy intends to do. 2
This definition has limitations for determining the breadth of the
"general statement of policy" exemption, however, because rules
clearly subject to notice-and-comment procedures may possess
these characteristics as well.Y
A "general statement of policy" has also been characterized as
nonbinding, whereas a rule is said to establish a "binding norm. 28
This approach emphasizes that rules are adopted pursuant to a
grant of legislative power by Congress29 and have the force and effect
of law whereas general statements of policy lack such force. This
Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. Rv. 1293, 1334 (1972). Failure to publish the policy or interpreta-
tion renders it without force or effect. Gardiner v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1972). The
Gardiner court, without explanation, equated agency policy statements subject to the rule-
making requirements of section 553 with those required to be published in the Federal Regis-
ter under section 552.
In addition, section 553 provides that the required publication of a substantive rule must
be made at least thirty days before its effective date but exempts "interpretative rules and
statements of policy" from the requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2) (1970). The term "substan-
tive rule" seems to refer to rules subject to notice-and-comment procedures. See Lewis-Mota
v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481 (2d Cir. 1972). It might therefore be argued that the
"statements of policy" exempted under section 553(d)(2) are equivalent to "general state-
ments of policy" exempted from the rulemaking requirements under section 553(b)(A). This
equivalence is of no aid in defining one or the other, however, since neither the statute nor
the case law has defined either term.
21 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 30 n.3. The Manual was written shortly
after the passage of the APA to explain the Act's purpose and effect to administrative offi-
cials.
n One court has found that an agency was not engaged in rulemaking where its action
was not one of approval or prescription. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 356 F.2d 236
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 816 (1966).
" See text and notes at notes 10-14 supra.
21 Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Overestimation, 60 YAM L.J.
581, 598 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Parker Article]. Parker does not use the term "binding"
in relation to opportunity to be heard but rather in relation to the legal effect of the pol-
icy-whether it has force of law.
21 DAvis TREATISE, supra note 6, § 5.03, at 299.
" Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471 (1937); United States v. Michigan
Portland Cement Co., 270 U.S. 521 (1926); see Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and S.
1879 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 452 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1160].
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perception, however, operates more as a conclusory concept than a
method of analysis. Where, for example, an agency has statutory
authority to promulgate rules, intends to adopt a rule with binding
legal effect, and follows section 553 procedures, the resulting policy
pronouncement is undoubtedly a "rule" with force of law. Where,
however, the agency's intent with regard to the legal effect of its
policy is ambiguous and the agency has not followed rulemaking
procedures but has the statutory authority to do so, asking whether
the policy has force of law may be much the same as asking whether
notice-and-comment procedures are required.
The definitions of "general statements of policy" thus embody
three characteristics: they are prospective; they communicate ag-
ency intentions; and they are nonbinding. Where the nature of the
pronouncement or its binding effect is unclear-in the center of the
continuum where policy statements merge into rules31-these defini-
tions are not very useful in determining the applicability of section
553 requirements.
2. Definitions of "Rules." Attempts to define a "rule" encoun-
ter many of the same difficulties of imprecision as the efforts to
define "general statements of policy." Definitions of rulemaking
generally focus on the difference between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion and do not attempt to differentiate between rules to which
section 553 requirements apply and other categories such as inter-
pretative rules, opinions, releases, rulings, practices, usages, and
policies.2 Nevertheless, there are some possible bases of distinction
that are mildly helpful in defining "rules."
The legislative history of the APA indicates that section 553
requirements were meant to apply only to the making of "substan-
tive rules"; 33 however, Congress made no attempt to clarify the
term.34 A possible source of explanation is the Final Report of the
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedures3
In discussing interpretative rules Professor Davis contends that the concept of "force of
law" fails to take into account the various refinements in the concept; hence, he advocates
speaking in terms of "degrees of authoritative effect of rules." This point is equally applicable
to policy statements. DAvis TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5.05, at 314.
11 "At some point," Professor Davis observes, "policy statements shade into interpreta-
tive rules which in turn shade into legislative rules. Interpretative rules are considered slightly
more formal than policy statements, and they usually have a slightly greater degree of binding
effect on the agency-a degree that is seldom clear." DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, supra note 1, at
103. See also Bonfield Ad. L. Article, supra note 20, at 115.
3'2 See DAviS TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5.01, at 289.
33 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 12, at 18.
3, See id. at 19.
31 The Final Report served as the primer for congressional deliberations on administra-
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which uses the term "substantive regulation" to describe regula-
tions developed through an agency's rulemaking function which,
like statutes, impose penalties upon or withhold benefits from those
who disregard their terms.36 This view of "rules" was followed by the
Attorney General's Manual which defines "substantive rules" as
"rules. . . issued by an agency pursuant to statutory authority and
which implement the statute, . . . Such rules have the force and
effect of law. '3 7
These definitions offer two possible grounds. for distinguishing
between rules to which section 553 notice-and-comment require-
ments apply and exempt statements of policy. The first possible
distinction is whether the policy was promulgated pursuant to sta-
tutory authority and implements the statute-a regulation is most
clearly a rule when adopted pursuant to a specific statutory grant
of authority. Since a rule may, however, also rest upon an implied
or an unclear grant of power,38 whether an agency has actually is-
sued a rule or an exempted policy statement cannot necessarily be
determined from construction of statutory provisions. This ap-
proach will thus yield a fairly clear conclusion only where there is a
statutory grant of power for an agency to make rules in a specific
situation and the policies promulgated pursuant to that authority
are intended to have legal effect.
A second possible distinction based on these definitions rests on
the conclusion that "rules" have the force of law whereas "general
statements of policy" do not. 9 This approach, however, also has
limited utility; it merely identifies with certainty the legal effect of
the two kinds of policy statements at either end of the continuum.
In the middle of the continuum, where general policy statements
tend to merge into rules, the approach is less useful because it fails
to take into account the degree of authoritative effect" and, more
importantly, is unable to designate the degree of authoritativeness
a statement possesses.
A third definition simply suggests that rulemaking resembles
what legislatures do in enacting statutes and defines rulemaking as
"legislation on the administrative level."41 Although this definition
tive procedure and was the document upon which the APA was largely based.
11 FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 27.
11 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 30 n.3.
DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5.03, at 299.
3, See text and notes at notes 28-30 supra.
, See note 30 supra.
, Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949). See also DAviS TREATISE, supra note 5, § 5.01, at 288 n.9.
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establishes the general contours of rulemaking, it depends on con-
formance to rulemaking procedures as the chief indicator of what is
a rule. In situations in which an agency does not follow section 553
procedures but parties are nonetheless bound in some way by the
pronouncement, it is less helpful."
Finally, an agency's own characterization of a particular policy
pronouncement provides some but hardly a conclusive indication of
its nature. The agency may expressly declare that it intends to
promulgate a binding regulation or it may claim that it only has set
out tentative guidelines for the future.43 Nevertheless, the label an
agency places on its pronouncement cannot be considered conclu-
sive; rather, it is what the agency does in fact which is the key.44 An
agency without rulemaking power may not turn an informal policy
into a binding rule by a simple declaration.
In summary, the definitions suggest that a rule, though not a
"general statement of policy," has the force of law and therefore
tends to have binding effect and that a rule is promulgated pursuant
to statutory authority. The definitions further establish that a pol-
icy pronouncement is a rule where an agency has statutory authority
to make rules, intends that the pronouncement have the force and
effect of law, and follows section 553 notice-and-comment proce-
dures. Similarly, the definitions of "general statements of policy"
indicate that when an agency decides to issue a nonbinding state-
ment of its future intentions without following section 553 proce-
dures, the agency has promulgated a "general statement of policy."
The difficulties arise where an agency has the authority to make
rules or general policy statements and does not follow section 553
procedures even though the policy pronouncement has some binding
effect and, like a statute, appears to compel specific conduct by the
affected parties. In this situation, where general statements of pol-
icy merge into rules, the foregoing definitions do not easily catego-
rize the agency pronouncement. Where this is true, it is necessary
to turn to the policies underlying section 553 to determine the ap-
plicability of its notice-and-comment procedures.
,2 Professor Davis concedes that this analogy to statutes is imperfect and of little use in
trying to classify borderline or mixed activities. DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 6, § 5.01, at 285.
4 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 481-82 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Colum-
bia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Continental Oil Co. v.
Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970); Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp.
858 (D. Del. 1970).
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II. RULEMAKING FUNCTIONS AND PURPOSES OF EXEMPTIONS
A. Rulemaking Functions
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act requires that
an agency, before adopting a rule, must publish notice of the pro-
posed rule and provide interested parties with an opportunity to
comment on it." The legislative history of the APA explains the
rationale for these two requirements." With regard to the notice
requirement, the legislative history indicates that public rulemak-
ing procedures are likely to be of little value either to interested
persons or the agency unless the subject matter of the proposed rule
is announced in advance. 47 With regard to the opportunity-to-
comment requirement, the legislative history explains that, since an
administrative agency is not ordinarily a representative body, "pub-
lic participation . . . in the rulemaking process is essential in order
to permit administrative agencies to inform themselves and to af-
ford safeguards to private interests." 41 Thus, Congress designed sec-
tion 553 to serve two functions: the education of administrative
agencies, which may also be termed encouragement of informed
policy making, and the protection of private interests.
1. The Protection Function. Section 553 provides affected
parties with an institutional mechanism for defending themselves
against the exercise of potentially detrimental discretionary agency
power." The rulemaking notice-and-comment mechanism provides
affected parties an opportunity to make the agency aware of possi-
ble detrimental effects of its proposed rule before it is enacted and
to persuade the agency to change the formulation of a proposed rule
in line with the reasons which they offer. Rulemaking is a particu-
larly important protection since Congress is not apt to overrule
administrative decisions for reasons of politics or inattentiveness
and the courts have a policy of broad deferral to agency discretion.S0
Thus, opportunity for private parties to provide information to
S 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 12, at 18-20.
' Id. at 18; FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 108.
" S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 12, at 19-20; FINAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 101-03.
" Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rule Making Relating to Public Property,
Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 541 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Bonfield Pa. L. Rev. Article]. See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 156 (3d ed.
1972); Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need
for Procedural Innovations in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1276, 1313-14
(1972), reprinted in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATvE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES 834, 871-72 (1970-72) [hereinafter cited as Hamilton Article].
" Bonfield Pa. L. Rev. Article, supra note 49, at 541-42.
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agencies operates as a significant protection against arbitrary and
ill-considered rules. 1
2. Informed Policy-Making Function. An agency's knowledge
and expertise is rarely sufficient to provide all the needed data upon
which rulemaking decisions should be based, and interested parties
can often provide much of the specific information needed for in-
formed policy making. Notice-and-comment procedures also aid the
agencies in determining whether and what kinds of rules should be
formulated 2 and open up "the process of agency policy innovation
to a broad range of criticism, advice and data, 5 3 thereby contribut-
ing to the sound and fair operation of government. 4 Thus, the in-
formed policy-making function consists of two elements: to assure
that individual agency decisions are made with as much informa-
tion as possible and, in line with broader systemic needs, to contrib-
ute to the process of informed and rational long-term policy devel-
opment.
Although the informal rulemaking requirements serve two very
important functions-the protection of affected parties and in-
formed policy making-these functions must be viewed in light of
the congressional reasons for exempting certain agency pronounce-
ments from section 553 requirements. It is to these reasons that this
analysis now turns.
B. Legislative Reasons for the Exemptions
It has been estimated that by reason of the exemptions to sec-
" Hamilton Article, supra note 49, 60 CALIF. L. REV. at 1314, reprinted in 2
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES at
872. Professor Hamilton suggests that there are problems with notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing as a protective device for private interests: "A person adversely affected in some serious
way by a proposed rule may find little solace in the opportunity to submit a written comment.
He has no way of knowing whether it will be read by the person with the ultimate power of
decision, or indeed, whether it will be read at all. Further, even if his views are considered
by the proper persons, he may feel that he should be entitled to a greater opportunity to
participate in the rulemaking process than the mere opportunity to file written comment."
Id. The contrary view, expressed often by agency personnel, is that agencies are careful, fair,
and thorough in formulating policy and therefore more formal procedures are unnecessary and
tend to obstruct the prompt implementation of programs. Id. This comment is not concerned
with the sufficiency of section 553 requirements in fulfilling the functions Congress intended
for them; rather, the comment accepts the legislative decision to fulfill these functions
through notice-and-comment procedures and seeks to determine when the procedures should
be applied to policy statements.
52 Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in the FTC's Enforcement of the Merger Law, 78
HAv. L. REv. 385, 385-86 (1964).
'3National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
5, Bonfield Pa. L. Rev. Article, supra note 49, at 540-41.
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tion 553 perhaps sixty per cent or more of all federal rulemaking is
done without public participation. 5 The magnitude of this figure
and recognition of the role of rulemaking in confining administra-
tive discretion warrant a close evaluation of the congressional rea-
sons for exempting interpretative rules, rules of organization and
procedure, and general statements of policy from the requirements
of section 553.
The legislative history of the APA indicates that there were
three reasons56 for the exemptions listed in section 553(b) (A). First,
Congress believed that agencies should be encouraged to develop
rules of the types that had been exempted and Congress feared that
the procedural burdens of section 553 might discourage agencies
from making these rules. Second, because the exempt rules vary so
greatly in their content and the occasion for their issuance, Congress
deemed it appropriate to grant the agencies discretion to choose
whether to undertake notice-and-comment procedures. Third, Con-
gress reasoned that section 553(e) of the Act, which provides inter-
ested parties with the right to petition for reconsideration of such
rules, 57 was an adequate safeguard against ill-considered exempt
pronouncements.
1. Encouragement for the Making of Exempt Rules. In stress-
ing this reason, Congress implicitly recognized that the protection
and information-gathering functions are not served sufficiently in
the cases of certain types of policy statements to warrant imposing
notice-and-comment procedures on the agencies. Administrators
may perceive compliance with these procedures as too burdensome
and conceal their policies from the public; nothing in the APA pre-
vents an agency from following an unstated, unpublished policy.-,
Congress therefore reasoned that agencies would be more likely to
" K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TExT-PROBLEMS 280 (5th ed. 1973). This figure
apparently includes not only the interpretative rule, general statements of policy, and agency
procedure and organization exemptions but also the other exemptions listed in section 553.
See the text of 5 U.S.C. § 553 at note 8 supra.
54 S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 12, at 18. See also Hutton, Public Information and Rule
Making Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 33 TEMP. L.Q. 58 (1959).
5' 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970).
" Parker Article, supra note 28, at 598. It is true, however, that some courts have begun
to require agencies to make rules where their discretionary power is viewed as too unre-
stricted. In United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), for instance, the court
required the Government to show that it "promulgated, enforced, and attempted in good faith
to follow" procedures designed to preserve evidence gathered during the course of criminal
investigation. Id. at 650. Other decisions have required agencies to give findings and reasons
for their decisions. E.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 95 S. Ct. 1851 (1975); Environmental Defense
Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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make and publicize certain rules if relieved of section 553 obliga-
tions. 9
An additional danger of increased procedural requirements is
that some agencies may follow rulemaking procedures where they
serve no purpose, thereby increasing their workloads and generating
substantial delays in the performance of their general administra-
tive duties. This efficiency concern is a substantial one because
agencies, in the course of their routine activities, are continuously
taking policy positions on a wide range of matters."0 Where the
functions of protection and informed policy making can be served,
Congress considered administrative delays and the possibility of
driving policy making underground by imposing the procedural re-
quirements of section 553 to be risks worth taking. Where such
functions are less well served, as Congress deemed was the case with
the pronouncements exempted under section 553(b) (A), the risks of
excessive rulemaking and the stifling of policy making were deemed
less reasonable. Congress did not provide, however, a formula for
relating its concern for efficiency to the needs for protection of af-
fected parties and informed policy making.
2. Difficulty in Distinguishing Among the Variety of Agency
Pronouncements by Statute. The second reason implicitly given in
the legislative history for the exemptions is the difficulty of devising
a statutory technique to distinguish policy statements within the
exemption from those which are not. In deciding to leave the matter
of public participation to the discretion of the agencies, Congress
emphasized that where such participation would be helpful to the
agencies or to the public, it should be sought. In so doing, Congress
further emphasized that the dual functions of the section 553 notice-
and-comment procedure should be the major determinant regarding
its applicability. Congress did not, however, fit this reliance on
agency discretion into the matrix of other considerations.
3. Right to Petition. The third reason for the exemptions is the
availability of the right to petition for the "issuance, amendment,
or repeal of a rule"6 under section 553(e) of the APA. Yet this right
is a poor substitute for notice and comment when those procedures
would serve the protection and informed policy-making functions.
Although affected parties may have notice of the adopted exempt
' S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 12, at 18.
6 Bonfield Ad. L. Article, supra note 20, at 113.
6, S. Doc. No. 248, supra note 12, at 200.
62 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970).
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policy statement through its publication in the Federal Register, 3
the notice is insufficient because it comes after the rule has been
promulgated when the agency is likely to have a vested interest in
retaining it unamended. In addition, the denial of a section 553(e)
petition may not be subject to judicial review.64 Thus, the right to
petition provides only a formal opportunity to bring a disagreement
with an exempt general statement of policy to the attention of the
agency, contributing little more to the protection of private inter-
ests. The limitations of the petition procedure are especially acute
when the pronouncement has some binding effect on the parties.
III. A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO DETERMINING WHEN
RULEMAKING Is NECESSARY IN POLICY FORMULATION
Because the scope of the "general statements of policy" exemp-
tion has only recently become a source of controversy, 5 a systematic
determination of its boundaries has not yet been developed. This
and other exemptions to section 553 have at times been broadly
construed by the courts.66 Yet the congressional intention that agen-
e See note 24 supra.
, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 9, at 39; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506
F.2d 33, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389
F. Supp. 689, 702 (D.D.C. 1974). There, the plaintiff had petitioned under section 553(e) for
review of existing corporate disclosure regulations and the agency had denied the petition
without comment. Since according to the statute the agency shall "[e]xcept in affirming a
prior denial or when the denial is self-explanatory . . . [give] a brief statement of the
reasons for denial," the court required the agency to state its grounds for denial, and specifi-
cally referred the Commission to an amicus curiae brief supporting the changes requested by
the plaintiff. Requiring reasons for denial of a petition compels more careful agency consider-
ation of its grounds, and may serve in the future as a technique for obtaining substantive
judicial review. Yet section 553(e) is neither a protective nor data-gathering mechanism; it
is only a limited check on regulatory decision making.
,5 Three cases decided in 1974 dealt with the subject: Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); and Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974). Earlier, three cases
touched on related issues: Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962) (publication
under original section 3(a) of APA); Brownell v. Schering Corp., 129 F. Supp. 876 (D.N.J.
1955), aff 'd, 228 F.2d 624 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 954 (1956); and the Supreme Court
examined judicial review of policy statements in the landmark case of Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
" See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970), where, despite
its recognition that "[t]he basic policy of section 553 at least requires that when a proposed
regulation of general applicability has a substantial impact on the regulated industry ...
notice and opportunity for comment should first be provided," the court held that the Federal
Reserve Board's pronouncement construing the Truth in Lending Act was an interpretative
rule to which section 553 procedures did not apply. In Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506
F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Commission's representation of the effect of its policy statement
was accepted by the court with little attention to the policy's practical effect on the parties.
See text and notes at notes 88-91 infra.
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cies follow notice-and-comment procedures where the protection
and informed policy-making functions can be served67 suggests that
a narrower interpretation of the exemptions is appropriate. Al-
though this congressional intent should not be undermined by an
expansive interpretation of the section 553 exemptions, the courts
have taken only the first steps in the direction of narrowing the
scope of the exemptions. Courts have frequently looked to the pro-
tection function in determining whether the procedural safeguards
of section 553 are required, but they 'have not as yet carried the
functional analysis to the point where both of the section 553 func-
tions are considered in their various permutations.68 The following
analysis suggests the relative weight to be given to these
functions-and the countervailing considerations of administrative
efficiency and encouragement of open policy formulation-in deter-
mining whether notice-and-comment procedures are required.
A. The Protection Function
The first stage in the proposed analysis focuses on the protec-
tion function of section 553 which has two elements: first, whether
the policy statement produces a substantial impact on the rights
and obligations of affected parties; and second, whether this policy
statement is binding in that the parties have no opportunity to
comment before the policy becomes effective.
1. Substantial Impact on the Rights and Obligations of Af-
fected Parties. Emphasis on this aspect of the protection function
represents the merger of the two principal judicial approaches to
determining when an agency policy pronouncement is a rule. The
first approach is referred to as the "substantial impact" test. In
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch (PMA)5 the
district court formulated a standard for determining when an
agency statement is to be considered a rule under section 553:
[W]hen a proposed regulation of general applicability has a
substantial impact on the regulated industry, or an important
' See text and notes at notes 45-54 supra.
" See text and notes at notes 18-20 supra.
" 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). In PMA the Food and Drug Administration vainly
argued that section 553 procedures were not required because the regulations issued by the
agency detailing new standards of evidence necessary to demonstrate the effectiveness of drug
products were merely procedural and interpretative. The court's analysis is equally applicable
to the general statements of policy exemption.
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class of the members or the products of that industry, notice
and opportunity for comment should first be provided.70
The court found that Federal Drug Administration regulations
which placed in jeopardy of summary removal from druggists'
shelves over 2000 drug products first marketed between 1938 and
1962 with FDA approval, produced a "substantial impact," an im-
pact compounded by the reliance of drug manufacturers on the
earlier FDA standards. Although the court was able to conclude that
a "substantial impact" was present, it did not explain when an
impact could be considered substantial.71
While no test has been devised to determine whether an impact
is "substantial," the Third Circuit gave greater specificity to the
concept of "substantial impact" in Texaco v. FPC.72 After stressing
that notice and comment should be followed "before establishing
rules .. .which have a substantial impact on those regulated,71 3
the court found a pronouncement changing the method of comput-
ing certain rebates to fall outside the "general statements of policy"
exemption and therefore within the area in which section 553 notice
and comment was required. The court asserted that a "'general
statement of policy' is one that does not impose any rights or obliga-
tions ' 7 on affected parties, thereby implicitly equating an altera-
tion of rights or obligations with substantial impact. This notion,
although often couched in different language, seems to underlie the
other decisions requiring rulemaking procedures upon a finding of
substantial impact.7 5
" 307 F. Supp. at 863.
" The standard developed in the PMA case has also been applied in such cases as Akron,
C. & Y.R.R. v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Md. 1974), and Continental Oil Co. v.
Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970), in determining the scope of the exemptions listed in
section 553(b)(A).
72 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969). In the court below the Commission had sought to rely on
the "good cause" exemption to section 553,5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B), contending that the insignif-
icance of the subject matter rendered notice and comments unnecessary. On appeal the
Commission sought to rely additionally on the "general statements of policy" exemption, an
argument which the court considered while reminding the agency that it could not introduce
a new theory on appeal. 412 F.2d at 744 n.9.
,1 412 F.2d at 744.
" Id.
,s E.g., Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972); PMA v. Finch,
307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970). Although the regulations in Pickus v. United States Bd. of
Parole did not require inmates to "change their behavior to conform," they were found to
"substantially affect" the rights of potential parolees because of the "considerable impact"
of the regulations on parole determinations. 507 F.2d 1107, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Similarly,
the procedures challenged in Nader v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974), changed
the rights of the consumer only insofar as they left him powerless to avoid being exposed to
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The courts' decisions in PMA and Texaco stress the effect on
the parties as the major determinant of whether an agency pro-
nouncement is a rule. Both courts stated that notice-and-comment
procedures were required where a regulation could produce substan-
tial impact on the rights or obligations of the parties. Although
neither court discussed whether the regulations were binding on the
affected parties, each court implicitly assumed that they were.
These cases thus fall within the first permutation of the protection
function, where the protection function alone compels rulemaking.
Other courts, however, have given more explicit recognition to the
second aspect of the protection function.
2. Binding Effect: Whether There is Opportunity to
Comment. Where an agency pronouncement has a substantial im-
pact on the rights and obligations of affected parties which is bind-
ing, in that affected parties have no opportunity to challenge the
policy statement before its application to them, the agency should
engage in section 553 rulemaking.7 The decision in Seaboard World
Airlines, Inc. v. Gronouski77 illustrates a court's explicit concern
with both elements of the protection function. The court found that
the agency's policy had a substantial impact because it deprived
Seaboard of almost all of its mail revenue, a major proportion of its
business, even though the company was afforded no opportunity to
present its views to the Post Office. The court stressed that the new
policy had the "force of prescribing a course of conduct which is
binding on the defendant's agents and with which the plaintiff is
required to comply. '78
An even greater concern for the opportunity-to-be-heard di-
mension of the protection function was exhibited in Nader v.
Butterfield,79 the facts of which illustrate how statements of policy
may be binding on affected parties. At issue was a Federal Aviation
Administration memorandum circulated to its regional offices pre-
potentially harmful X-rays. But cf. Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D.
Del. 1970).
76 See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rulemaking, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 271-72
(1938).
"7 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1964). The case involved a U.S. Post Office regulation that
changed a policy from one which permitted mail to accumulate and go out on the first all-
cargo flight available to one which required all mail to be routed by the most expeditious air
service. Seaboard employed turbine equipment for its cargo flights which could not compete
with the speed of jets and the frequency of the scheduled airlines which employed them.
11 Id. at 46. The court also rejected the argument that because the policy was directed
at agency personnel and not at the public, it fell under the personnel or procedure exemption
to section 533. Id.
11 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974).
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scribing criteria and standards for use of X-ray equipment by lines
for "carry-on" baggage inspection. The FAA contended that the
memorandum merely provided policy guidance to field employees
and that it did not impose a mandatory regulation. The court's
decision to require rulemaking was not based on whether the proce-
dures were mandatory but on the fact that X-ray equipment would
be put into operation before affected parties, such as airline employ-
ees or passengers, had the opportunity to present information re-
garding health hazards known to exist in the use of X-ray equip-
ment.
In Seaboard and Nader the policy statements produced sub-
stantial binding impacts on the parties-one economic, the other
involving health and safety. The parties had no opportunity to sub-
mit evidence on the appropriateness of contrary agency action be-
fore they were substantially affected by the policy. These cases too,
like PMA and Texaco, fall within the first permutation of the pro-
tection function, where the protection function alone is sufficient to
compel notice-and-comment rulemaking.
B. Informed Policy Making
1. Situations in Which the Informed Policy-Making Function
Should Be Relevant to the Applicability of Rulemaking Procedures.
The process of policy development by administrative agencies can
be usefully served by the incorporation of additional information
and divergent views. Where the protection function of section 553
does not in itself present a compelling case for the use of notice-and-
comment procedures, the applicability of these procedures should
depend upon the extent to which the information collected through
the section 553 process will contribute to the agency decision-
making process.80 The informed policy-making function should
serve as the key variable in determining whether section 553 proce-
dures should be used in situations falling within the second and
third permutations of the protection function: (1) where the
agency's policy statement is binding on the parties but the impact
is less than substantial; and (2) where the impact is substantial but
only possibly binding on the parties. The former situation is illus-
trated by the case of Pickus v. United States Board of Parole" while
30 The informed policy-making function demands that the agency base its policy deci-
sions on the facts as they are, not as the agency believes them to be. See Cramton,
Administrative Procedure Reform: The Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate
Proceedings, 16 AD. L. REv. 108, 111-12 (1964).
9, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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an example of the latter can be found in National Motor Freight
Traffic Association v. United States.12
In Pickus the District of Columbia Circuit was asked to evalu-
ate guidelines announced by the Board of Parole which specified
factors to be considered in determining the eligibility of federal
prisoners for parole. In rejecting the contention that the pronounce-
ments of the Board of Parole were exempt from notice-and-
comment procedures under section 553(b)(A), the court stated, "If
the regulations regarding parole hearings are likely to produce pa-
role decisions different from those which alternatives would be
likely to produce, then the exemption should not apply."83 The im-
pact found by the court was not substantial in the sense that the
guidelines and regulations would definitely produce a significant or
decisive effect on the parole decision. Rather, the court was willing
to require section 553 procedures where such regulations were
"likely to produce" different parole decisions. The court's interest
in protecting affected parties from a "likely" different result was
buttressed by its concern for performance of the informed policy-
making function. The court stressed the interaction of the twin
functions of section 553 in determining that notice-and-comment
procedures were necessary:
The outer boundary of the general policy exemption derives
from Congressional purpose in enacting Section [553]-that
the interested public should have an opportunity to partici-
pate, and the agency should be fully informed, before rules
having substantial impact are promulgated. 4
91 268 F. Supp 90 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd mem., 393 U.S. 18 (1968).
93 507 F.2d at 1114.
1, Id. at 1112. The court failed to note that the Board of Parole does not have legislatively
authorized rulemaking power. See 18 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970). This omission does not, however,
affect the validity of the court's approach. Courts should not hold that agency pronounce-
ments are not subject to section 553 solely because the agency lacks rulemaking authority.
But see DAVIS TEXT, supra note 55, § 5.06, at 137: the rationale for this approach is that the
courts are free to engage in plenary judicial review of an interpretative rule, policy statement,
or procedure where section 553 procedures have not been followed. The difficulty with this
view is that the court may treat the agency pronouncement as an interpretative rule, as the
Government argued in Pickus, and give it binding effect based on deference to agency ex-
pertise in the particular area. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Thus,
the availability of plenary judicial review of policy statements may very well be an incomplete
protection. If the approach based solely on the existence of rulemaking authority is accepted,
an agency pronouncement will be allowed to operate against parties who had neither an
opportunity to comment on it before being affected nor an assurance that the protection of
judicial review would be available. If a court determines that the protection of interested
parties requires that an agency pronouncement conform to section 553 procedures, as the
Pickus court did, but the agency has not been given rulemaking authority by Congress, the
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Thus, where the protection function plays a significant, but non-
compelling, role because the binding policy only possibly produces
a substantial impact, the goal of informed policy making can tip the
balance to require notice and comment. A similar interplay between
the functions is appropriate where the impact of a policy statement
on the parties is substantial but the statement is only possibly bind-
ing.
In National Motor Freight the court was asked to invalidate an
Interstate Commerce Commission statement detailing the proce-
dures to be followed by shippers seeking reparations for past unrea-
sonable motor freight charges on the ground the Commission had
not followed section 553's notice-and-comment requirements." The
Commission contended that notice and comment was not required;
it argued that since the new procedures applied only where the
formerly effective rate had been changed, the plaintiffs had an ade-
quate opportunity to challenge the procedures by protesting the
filing of a new rate. In rejecting this argument the court noted that
when a new and lower rate is filed, it may fall in an area of reasona-
bleness that included the old rate as well, so that the Commission's
subsequent approval of the new rate would not necessarily include
a determination that the old rate was illegal. Hence, the plaintiffs
might never have the issue of the procedure's validity reviewed by
the Commission in a later proceeding. Thus, the court concluded
that a section 553 exemption did not apply because the plaintiffs
might be denied an opportunity to be heard on a procedure which
produced a substantial impact on their businesses.86 The possibility
of the lack of an opportunity to comment was sufficient to require
notice-and-comment procedures:
[T]hat very quality of importance [the opportunity to com-
ment]-to the industry and to the public-is what lies at the
appropriate response for a court is not to give the pronouncement effect as a "general state-
ment of policy" but to require that the policy statement be reformulated to have a less
substantial impact on the parties.
Although the procedure exemption to section 553 was the basis for appeal, the court
also found that the policy was not exempt as a "general statement of policy." In addition,
subsequent courts have applied the reasoning of the National Motor Freight court to their
reviews of policy statements. See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
11 The National Motor Freight court initially discussed the possibility that the plaintiffs
would have no opportunity to contest the finding that the rate was too high in the context of
standing to sue. Nevertheless, the court's reference to this discussion in its analysis of the
section 553 issue appears to indicate that the inadequate opportunity for the parties to
comment was the basis of the court's determination that rulemaking procedures were neces-
sary. 268 F. Supp. at 96.
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base of Section [553] of the APA and which informs the Con-
gressional purpose in that law to expose proposed agency action
by general rule to the test of prior examination and comment
by the affected parties.87
The court implicitly recognized the interplay between the protec-
tion and the informed policy-making functions of section 553 where
an agency pronouncement produces a substantial impact on af-
fected parties with a possibly binding effect.
The courts do not, however, always consider the interplay be-
tween the dual functions of section 553 as they should. In Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC8 the District of Columbia Circuit ignored
aspects of both the protection and informed policy-making func-
tions which, if recognized, would seem to have called for invalidat-
ing the policy in question because it had been promulgated without
notice-and-comment. At issue was a Federal Power Commission
policy statement requiring natural gas pipeline companies to file
curtailment plans for periods of peak demand for natural gas. The
statement indicated that FPC approval of the plans would be con-
tingent on use of an "end use" basis for the schedules, and thus left
little doubt that the policy would have a substantial impact on the
distributors of gas and their customers. Ignoring that impact, the
court held that the policy statement did not provide an inflexible,
binding rule but merely provided advance notice of a general policy
which could be challenged by affected parties in the adjudicatory
hearings that would be held regarding each proposed schedule. The
later opportunity to challenge the policy was found sufficient to
protect the parties and inform the agency. However, the FPC's
statement actually revealed that this opportunity might be illusory:
"Barring extraordinary circumstances, our review. . . convinces us
that the priorities-of-delivery . . . should be applied to all jurisdic-
tional pipeline companies during periods of curtailment."89 Thus,
the later opportunity to comment on the appropriateness of the
policy was merely formal, and the strong presumption in favor of the
agency's position made the policy effectively binding.
Where, as in the Pacific Gas case, a policy will produce a sub-
stantial impact on affected parties without offering the parties an
effective opportunity for advance comment, the court should con-
sider whether requiring notice and comment would serve the func-
11 Id. at 96.
ss 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
81 Id. at 50, citing 49 F.P.C. at 584.
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tion of informed policy making. The Pacific Gas court did not con-
sider the need to inform the FPC and to make outside points of view
available to the agency on this issue at a time when the allocation
of fuel resources was a major national issue. The agency might have
found such views useful in the development of this important policy;
indeed, the FPC might have chosen a different formulation of the
policy if it had had the benefit of this additional information."0
Given the clearly expressed intent of Congress regarding the func-
tions of section 553, it is not unreasonable to argue that "in marginal
cases an agency should resolve the doubt in favor of giving the
public and industry members an opportunity to comment on a pro-
posed rule before it is finally adopted."9
2. Factors Suggesting When the Informed Policy-Making
Function Can Be Served. The significance of the informed policy-
making function to rational agency policy development, and Con-
gress's concern that the function be considered, compel full consid-
eration of its role where the protection function alone does not com-
pel use of rulemaking procedures. Of the countless situations in
which section 553 rulemaking can gether information crucial to in-
telligent policy formulation, four categories of situations stand out
in which the section 553 procedures are likely to provide the agency
with helpful or needed information that it would not be likely other-
wise to obtain.
a. Limited Agency Expertise.2 Where the agency is not tech-
nically proficient in the field in which policy is being formulated,
the opportunity-for-comment procedure is an appropriate method
of overcoming this deficiency. 3 In Nader v. Butterfield,94 for in-
stance, the FAA had promulgated standards for the use of X-ray
equipment for baggage inspection. Since the FAA was unfamiliar
with the dangers of X-ray equipment and lacked the expertise to
evaluate these dangers, outside information should have been
sought to provide a basis for reasoned decision making.
b. Limited Data on the Impact of the Policy. In Lewis-Mota
v. Secretary of Labor" the Secretary had, by suspension of a precer-
' See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
" Devcon Corp., 20 Ad. L. Dec. 2d 592, 597 (FTC 1966) (Comm'r Elman, dissenting).
1 See Fuchs, supra note 76, at 270-71.
3 Of course there may be some situations involving highly specialized expertise in which
consultation by the agency with a few industry experts will provide all the information the
agency is likely to need.
" 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974).
Is 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
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tification list, made it necessary for aliens with occupations on the
list to prove that they had a specific job offer in order to enter the
United States. The court concluded that the Secretary's action det-
rimentally affected the ability of employers to fill vacancies in the
occupations no longer precertified, leaving those employers without
recourse from immediate injury. Adherence to section 553 proce-
dures would have enabled the Department of Labor to become bet-
ter informed on the impact of the proposed action on the affected
employers.
c. Insufficient Practical Experience. In Airport Commission v.
CAB"9 the administrative action at issue was the Civil Aeronautic
Board's decision to order the consolidation of two North Carolina
airports. According to the court, the CAB's order was based on the
600-page record of a hearing it had held on the proposed consolida-
tion. The CAB's decision to receive the comments of outside parties
made crucial information available to the agency on the feasibility
of the consolidation, the needs of passengers and shippers in the
Piedmont area of North Carolina, and the ability of airlines to im-
prove services to the region as a result. The utility of outside infor-
mation on these kinds of practical questions should determine
whether section 553 requirements are justified by the informed
policy-making function. 7
d. The Need for Attention to Broader Policy Development.
Regulatory agencies generally neglect broad policy development98
despite the suitability of section 553 procedures for this purpose.9
A prime example of this is the FPC's failure to recognize the value
of notice and comments in development of long-term policy in the
Pacific Gas & Electric"°° case. Agencies should devote greater atten-
tion not only to developing an internally consistent body of policy,
but also to formulating policies which are integrated with those of
other agencies. When rulemaking procedures could aid in that de-
velopment, they should be employed.
The informed policy-making function of section 553 is meant to
encourage the interchange of ideas between the government and its
citizens, thereby providing a broader base for intelligent decision
9' 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962).
91 The court in Airport Commission held that the CAB's order was based on substantial
evidence and that the order was the product of neither rulemaking nor adjudication under
the APA. Id. at 187-88.
' J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 22 (1960).
" See text and note at note 9 supra.
'® See text and note at note 88 supra.
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making.01 Where the need for protection of affected parties is not
strong enough to demand conformity to section 553, but is neverthe-
less present in some significant degree, and useful information can
be provided to the agency through notice-and-comment procedures,
section 553 should apply to the agency pronouncement.
3. Administrative Efficiency and the Need for Nonbinding
Policy Making. Where the protection function does not by itself
compel compliance with section 553's protective requirements, and
the informed policy-making function can be only marginally served,
the determinants of whether notice-and-comment procedures are
required should be the extent to which such a requirement will
impede administrative efficiency and the issuance of policy state-
ments. The rationale of the efficiency dimension stems from the
notion that, although the exercise of agency discretion should in
general be structured by rulemaking, this structuring can be accom-
plished as well in some instances by the use of exempt "general
statements of policy" without sacrificing fairness or accuracy. Yet
society's interest in assuring public participation in the rulemaking
process, and in the development of informed policies, is sufficiently
important that exemptions from notice-and-comment procedures
should be countenanced only to the extent they are absolutely nec-
essary to preserve other values of equal or greater importance.102
Although efficiency in government is assuredly one of these values,
agencies must be careful not to overemphasize this consideration
since the complaint that increased cost, larger workloads, and gen-
eral delay result from the application of section 553 requirements to
policy statements can also be made with respect to rules clearly
subject to section 553 provisions. Similarly, the concern for not driv-
ing policy making underground because administrators perceive
section 553 procedures as too burdensome must always be weighted
in light of the strong congressional objectives of protecting affected
parties and encouraging informed policy making. Thus, the two
functions of section 553 should yield to the efficiency dimension only
where the functions will be insubstantially served by rulemaking
procedures and the efficiency dimension will be substantially
served.
There are at least three factors which should be considered in
See Kelly v. United States Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
10 See Bonfield Pa. L. Rev. Article, supra note 49, at 545; Bonfield Ad. L. Article, supra
note 20, at 106. This statement is, of course, also consistent with the strongly expressed
congressional desire to serve these two functions. See text and notes at notes 55-57 supra.
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determining the weight to be given to the efficiency dimension: the
frequency of agency promulgations of the same kinds of policies, the
value of the comments likely to be elicited and the amount of
comment likely to result from engaging in section 553 notice and
comment.
a. Frequency in Issuance of Similar Policies. Where an agency
frequently issues policy statements that are similar in kind and
effect, requiring notice and comment before issuing each of those
statements may cause an administrator to refrain from articulating
the statements, thereby injuring instead of benefiting the public. If
this is the case, rulemaking should not be required in situations
where the functions of protection and informed policy making will
be only minimally served.
Hearst Radio v. FCC103 involved a Federal Communications
Commission policy statement entitled "Public Service Responsibil-
ity of Broadcast Licensees." The court held that the publication of
the statement by the FCC did not constitute "agency action" and
therefore was not subject to judicial review. Had the policies con-
tained in the statement been promulgated separately in accordance
with section 553 procedures, the workload on the FCC would have
been great, and neither the protection of licensees nor the collection
of relevant data would have been advanced thereby. Although the
Hearst case does not specifically illustrate the likelihood that an
administrator will go underground with policy making, it does indi-
cate that the likelihood of agency promulgation of similar policies
is a factor to be considered in evaluating the need for section 553
rulemaking.
b. Value of Outside Comment. Where, for example, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration is considering a policy concerning the
functioning of a highly technical piece of airplane equipment, solici-
tation of outside comments may produce little or no information
that will add to the expertise of the FAA or to information already
gleaned from informal contacts with airline experts. Therefore,
where the solicitation of comment is likely to produce little informa-
tion of additional value, and observation of notice-and-comment
procedures will produce an inefficient use of an agency's time and
resources, rulemaking should not be required.
c. Amount of Comment Likely to Result. An agency may re-
ceive either so much comment on a particular subject that it will
1- 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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not be efficient for it to spend time examining submissions or so
little comment that the procedural formalities will not be worth-
while. The assessment of this factor is likely to be speculative;
hence, only limited weight should be accorded it in the balancing
of the efficiency dimension against the protection and informed
policy-making functions. Nevertheless, the need for efficient and
economical government should not be overlooked and procedures
should not be required where unnecessary.
This concern for efficiency and for the continued use of non-
binding general policy statements is meant to operate as a safety
valve. Its judicious use will prevent the courts and agencies from
using the functional approach to require rulemaking in the cases
where the functions underlying section 553's notice-and-comment
procedures will not be thereby served.
CONCLUSION
The analytic framework proposed in this comment provides an
approach for determining the appropriateness of rulemaking in the
promulgation of agency policy statements which is consistent with
the intent of Congress as expressed in the legislative history of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The approach is based on the var-
ious permutations of the functions of notice-and-comment proce-
dures and the competing functions to be served by the exemptions
to section 553. The central message of this comment is that courts
and agencies, if they are to give full expression to the intent of
Congress, should consider each permutation of the functions in de-
termining whether the agency pronouncement is a rule or an exempt
policy statement. If such a complete, systematic approach is fol-
lowed, clearer standards will emerge and the "considerable smog"104
surrounding this area of administrative law will be cleared to a large
extent.
Ricki Rhodarmer Tigert
11 See note 17 supra.
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